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Among the central arguments of the bestselling book and movie
Moneyball was the allegation that the labor market for baseball play-
ers was inefficient in 2002. At that time, Billy Beane and the Oakland
Athletics used observations made by statistical analysts to exploit
this market inefficiency, and acquire productive players on the cheap.
Econometric analysis published in 2006 and 2007 confirmed the pres-
ence of an inefficient market for baseball players, but left open the
question of to what extent, and how quickly, a market correction
would occur. We find that this market had in fact already corrected
by 2006, and moreover argue that the perceived market response
to Moneyball in 2004 is properly viewed as part of a more grad-
ual longer-term trend. Additionally, we use official payroll data from
Major League Baseball to refute a previous observation that the re-
lationship between team payroll and performance has tightened since
the publication of Moneyball .
∗This paper is adapted and updated from an analysis in our forthcoming book, The
Sabermetric Revolution: Assessing the Growth of Analytics in Baseball, to be published in
December 2013 by the University of Pennsylvania Press. (Baumer and Zimbalist, 2014)
Keywords and phrases: baseball, sabermetrics, market inefficiencies, labor markets, sta-
tistical modeling
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1. Introduction. Michael Lewis’s bestselling book Moneyball (Lewis,
2003) was published in June of 2003. Stripped of its storytelling, Lewis pre-
sented two strong theses. The first was that baseball executives had been
using the wrong metrics to value the productivity of players and that this
tendency was reversed by general manager Billy Beane and the Oakland
Athletics in the early 2000s. The second, as a consequence, was that cer-
tain skills were undervalued (market inefficiency) and intelligent executives
at small market teams could overcome their competitive disadvantage by
exploiting the skill undervaluation.
While the Athletics performed well above what their meager resources
would lead one to predict, the notion that sabermetric smarts could undo
baseball’s competitive balance problems engendered significant skepticism.
If Lewis were correct in his assertion of skill undervaluation, then the world
would know the secret shortly after his book was published and Billy Beane’s
advantage would soon disappear.
Central to Lewis’s narrative was the importance of a player’s walk rate.
On-base percentage (OBP)1 was more closely correlated with a team’s win
percentage and revealed higher consistency from one year to the next for
individual players than did a player’s simple batting average (BA). OBP
was more closely correlated to win percentage because a walk not only put a
runner on base and sometimes moved other runners up, but it also allowed
an additional batter to reach the plate during an inning and wore down the
arm of the opposing pitcher. Batting average did not capture the important
skill of having a good batter’s eye and being able to work a walk.
While the superior value of the OBP metric, relative to BA, is manifest
upon a moment’s reflection, sabermetricians have turned their attention to
more ambitious metrics, such as quantifying a fielder’s range or separating
out the value of good defense from good pitching. The analytic work done in
baseball front offices these days is guarded closely as proprietary with teams
seeking to reap the benefits of their discoveries as long as possible before
other teams catch on.
As the work of sabermetricians becomes more secretive, the speed of the
market adjustment process may slow. In the case of OBP, however, once the
Athletics’ strategy was recognized, it was easy for other teams to emulate
it. Indeed, it is possible that the appreciation of the skill of walking became
overdeveloped and OBP became overvalued; that is, the return to the ability
to work a walk may have outpaced the value of working a walk. Ironically,
to the extent that the market overadjusts to OBP or to other skills, gen-
1OBP is equal to (hits + walks + hit by pitch)/(at-bats + walks + hit by pitch +
sacrifice flies).
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eral managers who pursue this skill in the marketplace will find that their
team can be disadvantaged by the application of sabermetric knowledge. In
contrast, the laggard general manager who eschews analytics may be tem-
porarily advantaged by his obscurantism.
In any event, now, with ten years of market response since the publication
of Moneyball , it is interesting to follow how the skill of plate discipline has
changed in value over time. To study this question, we began with two pa-
pers by Jahn Hakes and Raymond Sauer (Hakes and Sauer, 2006, 2007). In
a 2006 article, Hakes and Sauer employ data from 2000-2004 to compare the
relative salary returns to changes in slugging percentage (SLG)2 and on-base
percentage (OBP) to the relative impact of SLG and OBP on win percent-
age. The key distinction they make is that SLG is a traditional measure of
batting prowess, while OBP is the sabermetric variable of choice. They find
that OBP is undervalued relative to SLG between 2000 and 2003, but that
this undervaluation is abruptly reversed in 2004, the year after Moneyball is
published. While instructive, this first article is limited by (a) only includ-
ing five years of data and one year of data after the book’s publication, (b)
the fact that both OBP and SLG include singles in the numerator and outs
in the denominator and, hence, are correlated with each other, and (c) the
likelihood that the valuation of SLG is a function both of its contribution to
winning and, independently, its contribution to fan enjoyment of the games
(extra base hits and home runs are more exciting to watch than walks and
singles.)
Hakes and Sauer published a second paper in 2007 that extended their
data set to 1986-2006 and introduced a refined separation of different hit-
ting skills. Hitting skills were now delineated as Bat (batting average), Eye
((walks + hit by pitch)/plate appearances) and Power (bases per hit). The
basic results corroborated those of the 2006 study. Eye was relatively un-
dervalued until 2004, when its valuation spiked. The authors also found that
the returns to Eye diminished in 2005 and 2006, indicating a possible over-
correction in 2004. By 2006, the return to Eye or plate discipline was at the
same level it had been in 2003.
In this paper, we seek to further refine the modeling of these relationships
and to take advantage of the time passed to follow the pattern of market
response through 2012.
2. Data & Methodology. Like Hakes & Sauer, our primary data
source is the Lahman database (Lahman, 2013), which contains seasonal
statistics for every player in Major League Baseball history going back to
2SLG is equal to (1 · singles+ 2 · doubles+ 3 · triples+ 4 · home runs)/at-bats.
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1876. We used the 2012 version of the database, and focused on the 798
team-seasons that occurred between 1985 and 2012.
The Lahman database also contains information about player salaries in
each year. However, the structure that governs the salaries of Major League
players is notoriously complex. There are three major categories into which
each player falls at the end of each season: free agent, arbitration eligible,
and pre-arbitration eligible (a.k.a., 0-3 player)3. If a player is a free agent,
then his salary in the next season is likely to closely reflect the market price
for his services. Conversely, if he is pre-arbitration eligible, then his salary
is unilaterally determined by his club, and is likely to be very close to the
league minimum ($490,000 in 2013). If he is arbitration eligible, then his
salary will be determined through a two-party arbitration process, which
will likely yield something approximating a market rate. (For free agent and
arbitration-eligible players, the correspondence between output and salary
will also be distorted by the presence of long-term contracts.) Thus, knowing
into which of these three buckets each player falls is an important factor in
estimating his salary. The central piece of data that determines into which
bucket each player falls is his major league service time, which accrues daily
for each day the player spends on a major league roster. These data can
be hard to find, but our service time data, which does not come from the
Lahman database, allows us to make more precise determinations on this
subject than Hakes and Sauer.
What follows is an overview of our methodology:
1. We build a model for labor market productivity, using three key of-
fensive performance variables. This gives us an understanding of how
these skills translate into winning on the field.
2. We build a corresponding model for labor market valuation, using the
same three key variables. This gives us an understanding of how these
skills are compensated on the labor market.
3. We compare the values of the corresponding coefficients. This helps us
to assess inefficiencies in the labor market for baseball players.
3. Modeling Labor Market Productivity. First, we want to under-
stand how certain skills translate into winning. Specifically, we are interested
in the following three skills:
1. Eye: walks plus hit-by-pitches per plate appearance
2. Bat: hits per at-bat (a.k.a., batting average)
3To be precise, under the most recent collective bargaining agreement, the 22 percent of
players between two and three years in the majors with the most service time also qualify
for salary arbitration. In previous agreements, 17 percent of such players qualified.
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3. Power: total bases per hit (a.k.a., Slugging percentage divided by
batting average)
These three skills are largely uncorrelated with each other, or at least, far
less correlated than more comprehensive statistics like on-base percentage
(OBP) and slugging percentage (SLG). While it may be the case that players
with excellent plate discipline tend to hit for more power, there is no reason, a
priori, to think that this might be the case. Moreover, unlike OBP and SLG,
the pairwise relationships among these three variables contain no functional
dependence.
¡¡INSERT TABLE 1 HERE¿¿
Our dependent variable is team winning percentage, but we consider this
relative to .500, which defines an average team. Also, because baseball has a
beautiful (though perhaps often overlooked) duality between offense and de-
fense, every statistic that measures something good for the offense measures
something bad for the defense. Thus, our explanatory variables measure
the difference between each team’s offensive performance and its defensive
performance. Accordingly, we fit, using least squares, the regression model:
WPct− .500 = β1(Eye−EyeA) +β2(Bat−BatA) +β3(Power−PowerA),
where EyeA, BatA and PowerA represent the opposing team’s offensive
performance, when playing the team in question. This is equivalent to the
model fit by Hakes & Sauer, and our coefficients agree with theirs over
similar time intervals. A summary of the results is shown in Table 1.
The first column of Table 1 shows the regression results over the full 28-
year period in our study. We note that while there is clearly more to winning
games than the three variables we have measured here, our model explains
81% of the variation in team winning percentage. In the four rightmost
columns in Table 1, we have broken the 28 years into four distinct periods.
The first (1985-1997) is far longer, and can be thought of as something of a
control. The period from 1998-2002 contains the five years immediately pre-
ceding the release of Moneyball the book, along with the actual season about
which the book was written (2002). The five-year period immediately fol-
lowing (2003-2007) is when we would expect to see the ideas from Moneyball
implemented in the baseball industry. Finally, the five years from 2008-2012
provide hindsight to Hakes & Sauer, and reflect the pitching dominant era
into which baseball has been thrown since improved testing procedures and
stricter penalties for performance-enhancing drugs were introduced.
We conclude from these data that although there is clearly some variation
in the value of these coefficients, the relationships among them remain rela-
tively stable. There seems to be little evidence of significant structural shifts
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over this time period.4 This makes sense, since while the game of baseball
changes continuously due to the revolving door of player talent, and small
rule changes, there is little reason to believe that the elements that lead to
runs being scored and games being won change dramatically, especially over
relatively short periods of time. Indeed, this was the conclusion that Hakes
& Sauer reached in 2007. In Figure 1, we plot the value of each of the three
coefficients as a time series after running the regression on each individual
season.
¡¡INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE¿¿
4. Modeling Labor Market Valuation. Now that we have a quan-
titative understanding of how Eye,Bat, and Power translate into winning,
it remains to assess how individual players are compensated for these skills
on the labor market. As we discussed above, baseball’s labor market is com-
plicated by its institutional constraints; thus, our task is harder, and we are
less successful at it. Unlike in the previous case, where our units of obser-
vation were teams, we now build a data set of individual players. Following
Hakes & Sauer, we use the natural logarithm of player salary in season t
as our dependent variable, and build a model for that as a function of that
player’s Eye,Bat, and Power in the previous season (t − 1). Only posi-
tion players with a recorded salary and at least 130 plate appearances in
the previous season were included.5 There were 8,824 such players during
1985-2012. Control variables were added to the regression model for:
• TPA: how many total plate appearances did the player have? Clearly,
if a player is playing regularly, he is likely to be paid more, regardless
of how well he hits.
• Catcher: was the player primarily a catcher? Catcher is primarily a
defensive position, so it stands to reason that catchers will make more
money than players of corresponding offensive value.
• Infielder: was the player primarily a second baseman, shortstop, or
third baseman? A similar, albeit weaker, argument can be made for
4Simple linear models for Eye, Bat, or Power as a function of Y ear yield p-values for
the F-statistic of 0.007, 0.493, and 0.497, respectively. Although the downward trend in the
value of Eye appears to be statistically significant by this measure, there do not appear to
be statistically significant structural changes within the time divisions we investigated. We
tested this by adding indicator variables for each time period, along with interaction terms
between those indicators and Y ear, to a multiple regression model for each statistic as a
function of Y ear. A nested F-test between these models and the simple linear regression
model yielded p-values of 0.859, 0.697, and 0.127, respectively. A Chow test would similarly
find little evidence of structural changes.
5Because the salary figures in the Lahman database are collected unofficially by volun-
teers, there are some players who have no recorded salary in a particular year.
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infielders.
• ArbElig: was the player arbitration eligible?
• FreeAgent: was the player a free agent?
• Fixed effects for Y ear: in order to control for baseball inflation and
other factors
Thus, our model for labor market valuation is:
ln(Salary) = β0 + β1 · Eye+ β2 ·Bat+ β3 · Power
+ β4 · TPA+ β5 · Catcher + β6 · Infielder
+ β7 ·ArbElig + β8 · FreeAgent+ γ ·Year ,
where Year is a vector of indicator variables for each year from 1986-2012,
and γ is a vector of the corresponding coefficients. The results from this
regression are shown in Table 2. As we are using the same model as Hakes
& Sauer, we attribute our slightly higher R2 values to the more accurate
contract data that we are using.
¡¡INSERT TABLE 2 HERE¿¿
Here, unlike our estimates of labor market productivity, we see dramatic
changes in the way that players are compensated for certain skills on the
labor market over time. In particular, we note that whereas a free agent
outfielder of average ability in 2000 would expect to earn approximately
$36,000 more had his walk rate been ten points higher, a player with the
same statistics could have expected approximately $125,000 in additional
salary in 2010, more than a threefold increase.6 In Figure 2, we illustrate
the changes in the coefficients for Eye,Bat, and Power over time.
¡¡INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE¿¿
There appears to be greater fluctuation in the labor market valuations,
as opposed to the labor market productivity, but the evidence in favor of
structural shifts is weak.7 As Hakes & Sauer noted that after reaching a
relatively low point in 2001, the return to Eye begins to pick up in 2002 and
6Over the 1998-2002 period, the average values for TPA,Eye,Bat, and Power among
the 1,748 players the data set were 447, 0.091, 0.272, and 1.59, respectively. If such a player
were a free agent outfielder, then his 2000 salary predicted by our model is $2,424,780.
However, if that players walk rate was 0.101, then his predicted salary becomes $2,460,973,
an increase of $36,193. The corresponding difference for a free agent outfielder in 2010 with
the same statistics would be $124,655. Since we are using year fixed effects, this result
controls for baseball inflation over the period.
7The p-values for the F-statistic of the simple linear model for Eye,Bat, or Power as
a function of Y ear are 0.089, 0.098, and 0.062. The corresponding p-values for a nested
F-test that includes in periodized interaction terms are 0.27, 0.846, 0.007. In particular,
there is evidence that Power was compensated more highly from 1998-2007 than in the
other years.
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2003, prior to the publication of Moneyball . The return then spikes in 2004,
the year following the book’s publication. They interpret these changes as
evidence that Moneyball changed the labor market in baseball. In the longer-
run context of the baseball labor market, while the rapid increase in the value
of Eye surrounding the publication of Moneyball may or may not be causal,
a more robust story is that the assimilation of the value of OBP by general
managers has been a gradual change that has evolved over decades. During
the 28-year window explored, the post-Moneyball spike in the valuation of
Eye is just a blip in a long-term change.8
In their 2007 paper, Hakes & Sauer question whether the noted decline in
the value of Eye from 2004 to 2006 is attributable to random variation, or
evidence of a market correction among general managers who had come to
see Eye as being overvalued by the market. Although the valuation of Eye
was equally high in 2010, it does appear that the post-Moneyball valuation
of Eye was abnormally high. Thus, while we see some evidence that the
average valuation of Eye is higher in the post-Moneyball era, the immediate
effect of the book’s publication has been mitigated. Given the rigidities in
the baseball players’ market and the pile-on nature of market response, it is
not surprising that the observed annual market correction process is neither
gradual nor linear.
5. Elasticity Models. Since the three offensive performance variables
have different scales, it is desirable to consider the elasticity of salary with
respect to Eye,Bat, and Power, by taking logs on both sides of the regres-
sion model. This represents a departure from Hakes and Sauer, and allows
us to interpret the coefficients as the percentage change in salary that is
associated with a 1% increase in each of the explanatory variables. In Table
3, we provide results from this regression. We note that the salary return
to Eye increased by 5.8 percent (from 0.138 to 0.146) between the 1985-97
and the 1998-2002 periods, but then shot up by 63.7 percent (from 0.146
to 0.239) in the immediate post-Moneyball period, before retreating 11.7
percent (from 0.239 to 0.211) during 2008-2012. It is also notable that the
returns to Power and Bat increased over the extended period as well9, al-
though they did not grow as rapidly as the return to Eye. This result is
evident in the Eye-to-Bat and Eye-to-Power coefficient ratios.
¡¡INSERT TABLE 3 HERE¿¿
Similarly, we can consider our labor market productivity model in terms
8This point is elaborated in Baumer and Zimbalist (2014), chapter one.
9This growth in the return to all skills should not be surprising given the sustained
increase in average salaries between 1985 ($370,000) and 2012 ($3.2 million).
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of elasticities. Since we include only salaries for position players in our labor
market valuation, here we include only offense, and use team runs scored
as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 4. We note that
these coefficients show considerable long-term stability, with little evidence
of meaningful change over an extended period of time. This corroborates our
earlier observation that the elements of the game that translate into winning
are relatively static.
¡¡INSERT TABLE 4 HERE¿¿
By considering the ratio of the elasticity of each statistic to salary over
the elasticity of that statistic to runs scored, we gain an estimate of the
relative return to each skill. We show these results in Table 5.
¡¡INSERT TABLE 5 HERE¿¿
It is interesting to note here that the ratio of these elasticities for batting
average has remained remarkably consistent over these time periods. This
suggests that however fairly batting average is being compensated on the la-
bor market, that relationship has not changed much, if at all. Conversely, the
return to Power has changed dramatically from sub-period to sub-period.
It appears to now be only about half as high as it was during the home run
boom of 1998-2002. However, it is also notable that between the 1985-1997
and 2008-2012 periods the return to power has stayed relatively constant,
increasing by only 1.6 percent. Conversely, the return to Eye increased by 61
percent between the first and last periods. Moreover, the relative return to
Power was three times higher than it was for Eye in the pre-Moneyball era,
but in the most recent period is only slightly higher.10 Further, the pattern
of the relative return to Eye corresponds to the market correction process
described earlier. Namely, the relative return to Eye increases in the late
1990s and the first three years of the 2000s, prior to the publication of Mon-
eyball , accelerates sharply during 2003-2007 to the point of overcorrection,
and then adjusts by falling 20 percent during 2008-2012.
6. Payroll Efficiency. Next we consider the relationship between team
winning percentage and payroll, indexed as the share of league payroll.11
Hakes and Sauer posit that with the improved metrics of the Moneyball era,
teams are better able to discern the true productivity of the players and,
therefore, the statistical relationship between team payroll and performance
10It is also interesting to observe that the return to power was highest during the apex
of the steroid power boom. While an economist might scratch her head at this outcome
(thinking that the plethora of home runs would lower the relative value of the same), it
appears that the steroid power boom produced both an ownership and fan fascination
with the long ball, only serving to increase its market value.
11Equivalently, each teams payroll divided by the league average payroll in that season.
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should tighten.
Indeed, Hakes and Sauer found “the explanatory power of team payroll in
predicting winning percentage has improved over time,” citing as evidence
the increase in R2 values for a simple linear regression model for team win-
ning percentage as a function of team payroll. Specifically, they found the
R2 in this payroll model for all 587 team-seasons between 1986 and 2006
to be 0.146. As noted above, the salary figures in the Lahman database
are incomplete. Further, to derive team payroll data from individual player
salaries would require knowledge of the entire 25-man roster, the players on
the disabled and the proportion of a year that traded players were on the
team.
We use official payroll data from the Labor Relations Department of Ma-
jor League Baseball, and find that the correct R2 over this time period is
0.228, a substantial increase over the figure reported by Hakes and Sauer.
In Table 6, we present the results from applying a regression model to team
winning percentage as a function of each team’s LRD payroll.12
¡¡INSERT TABLE 6 HERE¿¿
More importantly, Hakes and Sauer cited an increase in the strength of
the relationship between team winning percentage and payroll over time as
evidence that the window for exploiting market inefficiency in the manner
described in Moneyball may be narrowing; or, stated differently, Hakes and
Sauer suggest that the new, improved performance metrics and correction of
market inefficiencies since Moneyball has tightened the relationship between
team payroll and win percentage. We find no such evidence. While it is true
that the predictive power of payroll upon winning percentage is higher than
it was in the 1980s and early 1990s, it has been much lower in the 2000s than
it was in the late 1990s, and shows few signs of a long-term upward trend (see
Figure 3).13 An elegant way to test for structural breaks in this relationship is
to model winning percentage as a function of normalized payroll, along with
interaction terms for normalized payroll and an indicator variable for each
one of the periods. None of the terms involving any period was statistically
significant.
¡¡INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE¿¿
12LRD payroll stands for MLB’s Labor Relations Department measurement of payroll.
LRD payroll differs from the CBT (competitive balance tax) and players’ association
payroll in its treatment of benefits, deferred salary and discount rates.
13Again, a simple linear model for R2 in the payroll model as a function of time is not
statistically significant at the 5% level. The increase in R2 between 1985-1997 and 1998-
2002 may be a function of widening revenue inequality across teams and the Yankees’
remarkable string of success during the latter period.
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7. Conclusion. We employed data from 1985 through 2012, with peri-
odization, to test the existence of, the timing of the recognition of, and the
market’s adjustment to an inefficiency in the baseball labor market (specif-
ically, the hypothesized undervaluation of walks). We adapted the basic
model proposed by Hakes and Sauer, extended the data set, integrated more
accurate data on player service time, player salaries and team payrolls, and
introduced a double-log model to properly correct for scale differences in
the variables describing hitters’ skills. Finally, we explored whether a core
assertion of Hakes and Sauer – that there has been a linear trend for the R2
between team payroll and win percentage to increase as a result of the use of
better performance metrics and the disappearance or, at least, attenuation
of the labor market inefficiency – holds up when more accurate data is used
and the time period is extended.
Hakes and Sauer found evidence that the market inefficiency surrounding
OBP described in Moneyball existed in the period prior to the publication
of the book and then closed in the few years following its publication. As
evidence, they cite growing equality in the expected salary return to certain
batting skills from 2004-2006. We address this same question with a double-
log model, and compare the relative return to these same batting skills.
Hakes and Sauer left open the question of how the labor market would
react going forward. We find that the sharp increase in the return to on-base
skills in the period surrounding Moneyball is properly viewed in the context
of a longer-term evolution in valuation on the part of general managers.
While Moneyball may well have been a catalyst in accelerating the incorpo-
ration of value of OBP into the baseball labor market, these changes were
part of a more modest, longer-term trend. Moreover, the relative return to
walking has fallen since Hakes and Sauers observation, confirming their sus-
picions that the market correction in the years following Moneyball would
not be permanent.
Finally, using accurate payroll data from MLB, we find no evidence that
the relationship between team payroll and winning percentage has strength-
ened over time. This runs counter to the observation made by Hakes and
Sauer.
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Constant 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Eye 1.713 1.862 1.555 1.758 1.419
(0.081) (0.136) (0.167) (0.157) (0.217)
Power 0.264 0.272 0.219 0.260 0.319
(0.016) (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.039)
Bat 3.005 2.907 3.266 2.911 3.087
(0.074) (0.119) (0.150) (0.162) (0.174)
β(Eye)/β(Bat) 0.570 0.641 0.476 0.604 0.460
β(Eye)/β(Power) 6.497 6.839 7.117 6.747 4.448
N 798 348 150 150 150
R2 0.814 0.773 0.882 0.827 0.808
Table 1
Estimates of Labor Market Productivity. The dependent variable is Team Winning
Percentage. Note: In all tables, standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Eye 2.000 1.667 1.434 2.827 2.782
(0.210) (0.287) (0.417) (0.521) (0.562)
Power 0.667 0.611 0.745 0.731 0.578
(0.034) (0.049) (0.070) (0.086) (0.086)
Bat 3.672 3.402 3.910 4.274 3.828
(0.235) (0.334) (0.473) (0.614) (0.579)
β(Eye)/β(Power) 3.000 2.727 1.926 3.869 4.815
β(Eye)/β(Bat) 0.545 0.490 0.367 0.614 0.727
N 8824 3668 1748 1707 1701
R2 0.771 0.735 0.787 0.722 0.719
Table 2
Estimates of Labor Market Valuations. The dependent variable is ln(Salary).
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Eye 0.167 0.138 0.146 0.239 0.211
(0.019) (0.025) (0.038) (0.048) (0.050)
Power 1.050 0.920 1.178 1.213 0.978
(0.054) (0.075) (0.111) (0.137) (0.135)
Bat 0.904 0.826 1.009 1.121 0.894
(0.062) (0.087) (0.126) (0.165) (0.150)
β(Eye)/β(Bat) 0.185 0.167 0.144 0.213 0.236
β(Eye)/Bβ(Power) 0.159 0.150 0.124 0.197 0.216
N 8824 3668 1748 1707 1701
R2 0.769 0.733 0.786 0.720 0.717
Table 3
Estimated Labor Market Valuation Elasticities. The dependent variable is ln(Salary).
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
ln(Eye) 0.277 0.267 0.305 0.230 0.255
(0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
ln(Power) 0.854 0.982 0.774 0.957 1.027
(0.029) (0.048) (0.075) (0.066) (0.062)
ln(Bat) 1.758 1.671 1.850 1.960 1.69
(0.029) (0.047) (0.062) (0.064) (0.57)
β(Eye)/β(Bat) 0.158 0.160 0.166 0.117 0.151
β(Eye)/β(Power) 0.324 0.272 0.394 0.240 0.248
N 798 348 150 150 150
R2 0.911 0.908 0.918 0.910 0.917
Table 4
Estimated Labor Market Productivity Elasticities. The dependent variable is
ln(Team Runs Scored).
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Eye 0.602 0.514 0.478 1.040 0.827
(0.072) (0.102) (0.131) (0.236) (0.213)
Power 1.230 0.937 1.522 1.267 0.952
(0.075) (0.089) (0.206) (0.167) (0.144)
Bat 0.514 0.495 0.545 0.572 0.530
(0.036) (0.054) (0.071) (0.086) (0.091)
Table 5
Relative Return to Offensive Skills
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1985-2012 1985-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Payroll 0.089 0.090 0.107 0.085 0.074
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
N 798 348 150 150 150
R2 0.214 0.166 0.304 0.257 0.171
Table 6
Payroll Efficiency. The dependent variable is Team Winning Percentage.
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Fig 1. Estimated Labor Market Productivity Coefficients
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Fig 2. Estimated Labor Market Valuation Coefficients
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Fig 3. Coefficient of Determination in Payroll Model over Time - Each dot represents the
value of the coefficient of determination (R2) in a simple linear model for team winning
percentage as a function of indexed payroll in a given season.
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